However, some of those options are very cryptographically weak.
With the EAP options under WPA-Enterprise each user and device can have its own credentials and this increases control and auditing.
EAP) implementation should not be in an effort to increase the cryptographic strength of a wireless network but to provide other benefits such as granular control over who or what connects to the network. The use of WPA-EAP-PSK or any WPA Enterprise (i.e.
#Wep vs wpa password password#
WPA2-PSK, provided the shared password is of sufficient complexity, is unbreakable given current resources. The major distinction between the two should not be about cryptography.
There doesn't seem to be a lot of interest in it, either people don't want the complexity of WPA2-Enterprise at all (even with a simple authentication method) or they are content to use other more widely supported EAP methods. EAP-PSK has never passed the "experimental" stage of development. AFAIK, only wpa_supplicant has support for EAP-PSK and you will not find this native on most devices. Both the server and the client supplicant need to support the EAP method. Like other WPA2-Enterprise methods, you need to have an authentication server set up to authenticate against which adds complexity. However, many of the same vulnerabilities exist if an attacker were able to get a hold of the PSK (social engineering, written down, etc). WPA2 EAP-PSK should be somewhat more secure in that it would be harder to calculate the PSK from captured traffic. It is simple to set up and simple to use. The pros of WPA2-PSK is that it is supported in every 802.11 device of relatively recent manufacture (2nd gen 802.11g or so). It uses the PSK method of EAP and allows a client to authenticate with just the use of a PSK. WPA2 EAP-PSK uses WPA2-Enterprise to do an 802.1X authentication to server.
0 kommentar(er)
